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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EvIDENCE-COCONSPIRATORS Ex­
CEPTION-INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT-Statements by 
alleged coconspirators may be considered by trial court in its pre­
liminary determination of admissibility of those statements-United 
States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, affd on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406 
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U. S. L. W. 3579 (March 21, 1978). 
Late in the summer of 1974 Peter Pallotta grew desperate for 
cash to cover pressing debts from his nightclub operation in Re­
vere, Massachusetts. His brother, Bugsy, arranged a meeting with 
the defendant, James Martorano, at Martorano's Boston restaurant. 
At that meeting Martorano agreed to lend Pallotta $2,000.00. The 
interest was 5% per week. Payments were to be collected at Pallot­
ta's nightclub every Friday night. Pallotta made a few sporadic 
payments, but he soon fell behind as his nightclub operation 
failed.! Finally, in November of 1974, Pallotta's fear of Martorano's 
strong-arm collection tactics prompted him to seek FBI protective 
custody in return for his services as a cooperating witness against 
Martorano. 
Between November 1974 and January 1975 Pallotta cooperated 
with the FBI by making phone calls to Martorano, Brian Halloran 
(Martorano's co-defendant),2 Jimmy Matera,3 and Frank Pagano. 4 
During the conversations, Pagano and Matera made statements in­
dicating that Pallotta could be in physical danger if he went to 
Martorano's restaurant. These statements tended to show both that 
Pallotta was the victim of extortion and that Martorano was in­
volved in the scheme to extort. 
The FBI monitored these calls and the prosecution used the 
Matera-Pallotta and Pagano-Pallotta statements to convict Mar­
1. Pallotta's problems went considerably beyond one delinquent loan. In a let­
ter to his brother, Bugsy, Pallotta named his creditors as "Mario and Tony from Re­
vere, Vinny the Pig, and Bobby, Joe Balliro, Whitey and Louie from South Boston, 
and your friend Johnny." Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 16, United States v. Mar­
torano, 557 F.2d 1, aird on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 
U.S.L.W. 3579 (March 21, 1978). 
2. Pallotta described Halloran as "a loan shark, collector and enforcer and a 
madman." United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1977). Halloran was ac­
quitted on four counts of extortion. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Sllpra note 1, at 5. 
3. Matera was present at Martorano's restaurant when the loan was consum­
mated. At that time he received instructions from Martorano regarding the Friday 
night collections. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Sllpra note 1, at 7. 
4. According to Pallotta, Pagano had been Matera's loan sharking partner for 
twenty years. ld. at 8. 
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torano of four counts of extortion under the Consumer Credit Pro­
tection Act. 5 These conversations were admitted into evidence 
under the coconspirators exception to the hearsay rule,6 which 
provides that a coconspirator's declaration in furtherance of the 
conspiracy is competent evidence against all coconspirators. On ap­
peal Martorano argued that the trial court erred in applying the 
exception to the Pagano conversations. Specifically, he contended 
that the prosecution's preliminary showing of conspiracy, which is a 
precondition to applying the exception, was deficient. 
In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that the trial court, in its preliminary evaluation of the 
evidence showing a Martorano-Pagano conspiracy, properly consid­
ered the contents of some of the monitored conversations. 7 In the 
view of the appellate court these conversations,8 when considered 
along with independent evidence of the conspiracy,9 formed a suf­
ficient preliminary showing of conspiracy to permit these and other 
Pagano-Pallotta conversations to be admitted into evidence against 
Martorano under the coconspirators exception. Because the pur­
pose of the preliminary evaluation was to determine the admissibil­
ity of the Pagano hearsay statements under the exception, the 
court's reliance on the content on some of the statements to make 
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1970). The indictment charged Martorano with two 
counts of conspiracy and two substantive offenses (extortionate extension of credit 
and collection by extortionate means). 18 U.S.C. § 892(a) (1970) provides: "Whoever 
makes any extortionate extension of credit, or conspires to do so, shall be fined not 
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 894(a) 
(1970) provides: 
Whoever knowingly participates in any way, or conspires to do so, in the use 
of any extortionate means 
(1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or 
(2) to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof, 
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 20 years, or 
both. 
Matera and Pagano were also indicted on similar charges, but were tried separately. 
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 5. 
6. "A statement is not hearsay if ... [tlhe statement is offered against a party 
and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in further­
ance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
7. United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12, afI'd on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406 
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3579 (March 21, 1978). 
8. The specific conversations relied on by the court of appeals revealed that 
Pagano and Matera had supplied to Martorano half the money he loaned to Pallotta. 
Id. This fact conclusively links Pagano and Martorano in conspiracy, which allows all 
the other Pagano statements into evidence against Martorano under the coconspirators 
exception. 
9. The court found the independent, nonhearsay evidence of Pagano's in­
volvement "not terribly compelling." [d. 
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out a preliminary showing resulted in the hearsay declarations 
"bootstrapping" their way to the level of competent evidence. To 
the extent that the court relied on the hearsay to establish its own 
competence, it in effect abandoned the requirement of indepen­
dent evidence. 
This application of the coconspirators exception not only differs 
markedly from the common law procedures,10 but also conflicts 
with interpretations of the Federal Rules of Evidence forwarded by 
the other circuits.l1 In these other circuits, as well as at common 
law, a showing of conspiracy from evidence independent of the 
hearsay sought to be admitted remains a prerequisite to admitting 
coconspirator declarations. 
The court of appeals tempered its unprecedented holding in 
United States v. Martorano 12 in an opinion on rehearing, Mar­
torano II.13 In the second opinion, the court ruled that certain 
statements made by Pagano to Pallotta were admissible in their 
own right as "verbal acts."14 These verbal acts could be considered 
along with the other independent, nonhearsay evidence linking 
Pagano and Martorano in conspiracy. Because the evidence con­
sidered in the preliminary detennination was now characterized as 
admissible, and hence prima facie reliable, the court found a suffi­
cient preliminary showing of conspiracy without resorting to the 
bootstrap procedures of Martorano 1. 15 
The "verbal act" reasoning in Martorano II represented a sec­
ond attempt to bring the statements in question within the bounds 
of the traditional hearsay exception. However, even on rehearing, 
10. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942), describes the traditional 
requirement of independent evidence. In passing on the sufficiency of the evidence 
convicting a former U.S. Attorney of fraud and corruption, the Court held: "However, 
such declarations are admissible over the objections of an alleged co-conspirator, 
who was not present when they were made, only if there is proof aliunde that he is 
connected with the conspiracy .... Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own 
bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." rd. at 74-75 (citations omitted). 
11. United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1977); United States 
v. Haynes, 560 F.2d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 
835 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Savell, 546 F.2d 43, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 
626-27 (3d Cir.), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1976); United States v. Stroupe, 538 
F.2d 1063, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 118 
n.246 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cen. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2641 (1977). 
12. 557 F.2d 1, aff'd on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 
U.S.L.w. 3579 (March 21, 1978). 
13. 561 F.2d 406 (lst Cir. 1977). 
14. See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra. 
15. 561 F.2d at 406-07. 
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the court reaffirmed its initial reading of the Federal Rules, and 
defended its reasons for allowing the bootstrap procedure. Both the 
bootstrapping of Martorano I and the verbal act reasoning of Mar­
torano II represent clear departures from the preliminary showing 
required under the exception at common law. 
The coconspirators exception at early common law grew out of 
the rule, still in force today, which considered a party's out of court 
admissions16 to be competent evidence, even when introduced to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Admissions are competent 
evidence, not because they are inherently reliable, but rather be­
cause a party to an adversary proceeding should be held respon­
sible for her past statements. The party has the responsibility to 
explain away the inconsistencies between the admission and the 
position maintained at trial. 17 
Admissions by a coconspirator were deemed competent evi­
dence against a defendant because the declarant was said to be the 
defendant's agent.18 The declarant's admission was imputed to the 
defendant by the principle of respondeat superior. The term "vi­
carious admission" aptly describes the exception in this early com­
mon law form. 
Agency principles no longer support the exception. 19 Rather, 
the prosecution's great need for this evidence presently explains 
the admissibility of coconspirator declarations. 2o The significance of 
16. An admission is "anything said by the party-opponent ... provided it 
exhibits the quality of inconsistency with the facts now asserted by him in pleadings 
or in testimony." 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048, at 4 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (em­
phasis in original). 
17. [The witness] is confronting the very person whose statements he is 
reporting, he is subject to cross-examination by counsel who has at his 
elbow the person who knows all the facts and circumstances of the alleged 
statements and who is therefore in the best possible position to conduct a 
searching inquiry, and, finally, the declarant may himself go upon the stand 
and deny, qualify or explain the alleged admissions. 
Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355, 361 
(1921). 
18. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926), contains 
Learned Hand's classic statement of the conspiracy-agency theory. "When men enter 
into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, 
and have made a 'partnership in crime.' What one does pursuant to their common 
purpose, all do, and, as declarations may be such acts, they are competent against 
all." 13 F.2d at 967. 
19. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1954). 
20. ld. at 1164; Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 
HARV. L. REV. 920, 989 (1959). 
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the new rationale is that, even though the rule remains in the same 
form, the admissibility of coconspirator declarations can no longer be 
justified on the basis of an "imputed admissions" theory. Instead, 
the admissibility issue must be recast in terms of reliability. 21 
Consequently, the modern coconspirators exception seeks to 
separate reliable from unreliable coconspirator declarations. Courts 
accomplish this separation by requiring that the three elements of 
the exception be satisfied as a precondition to the admissibility of 
coconspirator statements. These elements are that 1) the statement 
must have been made during the conspiracy, 2) in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, and 3) there must be independent evidence of the con­
spiracy and the defendant's participation therein. 22 Under the mod­
ern exception, the requirement of independent evidence serves to 
demonstrate the reliability of the hearsay rather than to establish 
an agency relationship. 
Under Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E)23 the coconspirators exception 
remains substantially similar to the common law exception. The 
federal rule omits express reference to the independent evidence 
requirement, but impliedly retains the requirement by its use of 
the word "conspirator. "24 Furthermore, the comments to the rule 
21. Morgan, Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461, 463 
(1929). The reliability of coconspirator declarations is questionable. The speaker may 
be intentionally deceiving his audience, bragging, or sincerely misinformed. In order 
to narrow the scope of this note, bona fide coconspirator declarations are presumed 
reliable. The remaining problem is identifying a bona fide coconspirator declaration. 
"In the absence of some special guarantee of reliability inherent in the cir­
cumstances surrounding the making of such statements, their admission in criminal 
cases presents a significant danger of misguided convictions." Davenport, The Con­
frontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A 
Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1378 (1972). 
22. E.g., United States v. Lambros, 564 F.2d 26, 29-30 (8th Cir. 1977). 
23. See note 6 supra. 
24. This language is designed to deal with two conditions which in the 
Uniform Rules are stated separately. The first Uniform Rule condition, 
which the unpublished comments of the Advisory Committee indicate was 
intended to be expressed in R~le 801 "without difference in meaning," is 
that "the party and the declanint were participating in a plan to commit a 
crime or civil wrong." The significance of this condition is that there must 
be evidence independent of the hearsay establishing a defendant's participa­
tion in the conspiracy before such declarations are admissible against him. 
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ~ 801(d)(2)(E)(01) at 801-148 
(footnotes omitted). United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1977), expressly 
supports this view. "In the present case, the relevant prerequisites to admission of 
[coconspirator statements] are embodied in the word 'coconspirator': The govern­
ment must show by evidence independent of the statement (1) that a conspiracy 
existed and (2) that [defendant] was a member of it." 562 F.2d at 1141. 
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cite the Califomia25 and New Jersey26 versions of the exception as 
being comparable to the federal rule. Independent evidence of 
conspiracy is required in both states. 27 
Although the substantive content of the exception remains as it 
was at common law, the Federal Rules provide a different 
mechanism for applying the exception. Prior to the adoption of the 
Federal Rules, the jury evaluated the preliminary independent 
showing of conspiracy. Only if the jury was convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt,28 from evidence independent of the hearsay, that 
a conspiracy existed between the declarant and the defendant, was 
it permitted to consider the hearsay against the defendant. Jurors, 
however, were often unwilling or unable to ignore the hearsay in 
25. CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1223 (West 1966) provides: 

ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR. Evidence of a statement offered against a 

party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: 

(a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a 
conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the 
objective of that conspiracy; 
(b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that the party 
was participating in that conspiracy; and 
(c) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence sufficient 
to sustain a finding of the facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in 
the court's discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission of 
such evidence. 
26. N.]. R. EVID. 63(9) provides: 
VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS. A statement which would be admissible if made by 
the declarant at the hearing is admissible against a party if ... (b) at the 
time the statement was made the party and the declarant were participating 
in a plan to commit a crime or civil wrong and the statement was made in 
furtherance of that plan. 
27. The New Jersey statute more closely resembles the Federal Rule in that it 
contains no express requirement of independent evidence. In State v. Benevento, 
138 N.J. Super. 211, 350 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 1975), cer!. denied, 70 N.J. 276, 359 
A.2d 488 (1976), the court interpreted the provision as implicitly including the re­
quirement: 
It is clear that in a conspiracy case a statement by one conspirator is admis­
sible against another conspirator if made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Since there was proof aliunde of the complicity of [defendant] as a con­
spirator the out-of-court statement of Benevento was properly admitted. See 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1941). 
Id. at 217, 350 A.2d at 488, (citations omitted). 
28. The practical limitations of the jury favor using the severe "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard: 
The jury is already concerned with the evidence-weighing standards in­
volved in proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To expect them not only to 
compartmentalize the evidence ... , but as well to apply to the independent 
evidence the entirely different evidence-weighing standards required of a 
prima facie case, is to expect the impossible. 
Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963). 
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making the preliminary determination. 29 Furthermore, the identity 
of the preliminary and ultimate issues often made the exercise 
seem futile. 30 As a result of these problems, the common law 
method allowing the jury to decide the preliminary issue was inef­
fective. Jurors' confusion often caused them to forgo the prelimi­
nary determination entirely. 
Federal Rule 104,31 which deals with preliminary questions of 
admissibility, remedies the weakness of the common law method 
by reallocating the responsibility for making the preliminary de­
termination to the trial judge. 32 This reallocation, however, creates 
serious new difficulties. 33 Martorano 1 spotlights the most impor­
29. The Supreme Court noted the heavy burden that application of the 
coconspirators exception placed on jurors in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 
619 (1953). 
30. "The declarations are admissible against the defendants if they are co­
conspirators. If they are co-conspirators they are guilty." Carbo v. United States, 314 
F.2d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 1963). Where substantive crimes are charged in addition to a 
conspiracy count, the limiting instruction may have some effect. The less congruous 
the preliminary and ultimate issues are, the more likely the jurors will perceive the 
nature of the two separate tasks. See 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FED­
ERAL EVIDENCE § 33 (1977). 
31. FED. R. EVID. 104 provides in part: 
(a) QUESTIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY GENERALLY. Preliminary questions con­
cerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, 
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it 
is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
(b) RELEVANCY CONDITIONED ON FACT. When the relevancy of evidence 
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it 
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a find­
ing of the fulfillment of the condition. 
32. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). See note 31 supra. Overtones of conditional relevance 
are often superimposed on the preliminary evaluation in conspiracy cases. Prelimi­
nary questions of conditional relevance remain jury questions under FED. R. EVID. 
100(b). However, when applying the coconspirators exception, the issue is more 
properly framed as a question of admissibility for the judge under rule 100(a). See 
Advisory Committee's Notes to rule 104(b); 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 
30, § 26; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 24, ~ 104(05); 21 C. WRIGHT & 
K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 5053, 5055 (1977). But see 
Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigation: Put­
ting the Conspiracy Back into the Conspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1976). 
33. One problem with the new approach is that it does not specify the strength 
of the preliminary showing needed to justify application of the exception. One view 
suggests that the preliminary proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 J. WEIN­
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 24, ~ 104(05). This standard protects defendants. 
However, since such protection is not constitutionally required, see, e.g., United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974), and places a heavy burden on the prosecu­
tion, most courts use a lower standard. No consensus exists among the circuits re­
garding the proper preliminary standard. E.g., United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 
1294, 1299 nA (2d Cir. 1977). The circuits even disagree as to the relative severity of 
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tant new difficulty and clearly illustrates the potential magnitude of 
the modification. 
The most dramatic problem raised by allowing the judge alone 
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence comprising the pre­
liminary showing is that it becomes unclear which types of evidence 
he or she may consider. Rule 104(a) provides: "In making its [the 
court's] determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence ex­
cept those with respect to privileges." In Martorano I & II, the 
First Circuit interpreted this language as allowing the preliminary 
determination to be based on inadmissible evidence, including 
hearsay and perhaps the very statement to be admitted. The court 
reasoned that, because the trial judge is sensitive to the weakness­
es of hearsay, he or she is capable of assessing its proper weight in 
making a preliminary determination. Furthermore, the court per­
ceived no difference between hearsay in general and a coconspira­
tor's hearsay statement. 34 Therefore, the judge may consider the 
statement seeking admittance, along with other hearsay and inde­
pendent evidence, when making a preliminary determination re­
garding conspiracy. 
Although easing the independent evidence requirement35 ini­
tially appears to be a reasonable result under the Federal Rules, a 
more comprehensive examination of the rules and the policies they 
embody reveals the result to be unwarranted. The arguments favor­
ing retention of the independent evidence requirement range from 
statutory construction of the Federal Rules themselves, to sixth 
amendment constitutional limitations. 
Working within the Federal Rules, the abrogation of the inde­
pendent evidence requirement must fail for two reasons. First, it 
conflicts with the implied retention of the requirement in rule 
801(d)(2)(E).36 Second, the provision of rule 104(a) freeing the 
the standards they use. Compare Stanchich, with United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 
806,811-12 (3d Cir. 1976) and United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20,23 (1st Cir. 
1977). In Petrozziello the First Circuit held that the reallocation requires a higher 
standard of proof than the common law method because the defendant no longer 
enjoys the safeguards of a jury decision on the preliminary determination. ld. at 23. 
34. "It seems that, once hearsay is placed before the district court, it would be a 
matter of indifference to the criminal defendant what its source is." 561 F.2d at 408. 
35. The court maintained that "under any view of the law we would, as we said 
in our original opinion, require Significant independent evidence of the existence of 
the conspiracy ...." ld. at 408. However, "significant independent evidence" is 
simply too amorphous a standard to review. Once the preliminary evaluation is 
tainted with bootstrap evidence, the independent quality is destroyed. 
36. See note 24 supra. 
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judge from the rules of evidence should be viewed as a permissive 
feature rather than an affirmative mandate. 37 Since it is an overall 
procedural feature, the rule should complement, not supplant, sub­
stantive principles of law. 38 Since the coconspirators exception 
represents the union of hearsay and conspiracy law, it should be 
doubly resistant to this modification. 
The abrogation of the independent evidence requirement also 
threatens the fundamental safeguards provided by the Constitution. 
Ultimately, all hearsay exceptions in criminal cases must satisfy 
basic reliability requirements39 inherent in the sixth amendment 
right to confrontation. 4o As modified by the approach in Martorano 
I, the coconspirators exception lacks the assurances of reliability 
provided by the independent evidence requirement. 41 The deter­
37. The last sentence of the rule is not an open invitation to ignore the 
rules of evidence. Rather, it calls for good sense to suit the needs of speed 
and convenience at the trial. In many instances the evidence considered by 
the court wiII also have to be considered by the jury-as for example in de­
termining the existence and membership of a conspiracy for admission of 
conconspirator's hearsay .... Since, in such cases, the court must decide 
whether a reasonable jury could decide for the proponent it makes sense on 
the preliminary determination only to consider the same evidence the jury 
will have before it~i.e., admissible evidence. 
1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 24, ~ 104(02) at 104-25. 
38. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 32, at § 5053, where rule 104 is 
characterized as a "residual rule" and a "fall-back position." The authors emphasize 
that this rule should not aIter substantive law. Two examples given where the rule 
should defer to substantive law are the parol evidence nile and the principle of 
agency law whereby the out-of-court statements of an agent are not admissible to 
prove the agent's authority. The analogy between agency and conspiracy is clear. 
The substance of the coconspirators exception should control here instead of the 
procedural provision of rule 104. 
39. In Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), the Supreme Court concisely 
restated its interpretation of the confrontation clause: 
The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure that there "are indicia of 
reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a 
statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of 
the declarant," ... and to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for 
evaluating the truth of the prior statement," .... It is clear ... from numer­
ous prior decisions of this Court, that even though the witness be unavail­
able his prior testimony must bear some of these "indicia of reliability," re­
ferred to in DlittOIl. 
408 U.S. at 213 (citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 
(1970), and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)). 
40. The sixth amendment provides in part that "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him 
...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
41. 'The extent to which the reliability of the hearsay at issue is guaranteed 
depends on the reliability and probative value of the independent evidence actually 
presented." Davenport, supra note 21, at 1389. 
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mination that the statement was uttered during a conspiracy must 
precede any reliance on the content of the statement because the 
reliability of the content is directly derived from its origins in con­
spiracy.42 Conspiracy is the raison d'etre of the exception. Without 
a preliminary independent showing of conspiracy, statements of an 
alleged coconspirator have insufficient indicia of reliability to justify 
the absence of actual confrontation in open court. 
While the Martorano I approach might yield an objectively 
correct result in any given case, the procedure lacks the stability 
and dependability that are indispensable to evidence law in the 
criminal setting. The specific defect of Martorano I is that it fails to 
exclude Frank Pagano's statements from James Martorano's trial; its 
broader defect is that the procedure it announces provides no 
means by which to distinguish the statements of a Frank Pagano 
from those of a Walter Mitty. 
Perhaps after considering the extent to which its initial holding 
departed from settled principles of evidence in conspiracy cases, 
the court attempted to muffie the ramifications of Martorano I in 
its opinion on rehearing. Martorano II reiterated the validity of the 
approach in the earlier opinion, but sought alternative grounds on 
which to affirm the conviction. Since upholding the conviction de­
pended upon the proper application of the coconspirators exception, 
the court needed an alternative method of satisfying the indepen­
dent evidence requirement. 
To satisfy this requirement the court resorted to the amor­
phous notion of "verbal acts. "43 Verbal acts, as used by the court in 
Martorano II, are statements that inferentially indicate the declar­
42. The quandary can be symbolized: 
Let A= a coefficient of reliability, 
x= the content of the coconspirator's statement, and 
y= independent evidence. 
Admissibility of x turns on the value of A. The court determines the value of A by 
evaluating the preliminary showing of conspiracy. The probative value, Q, of the 
coconspirator's statement is a function of A such that 
Q = Ax. 
The traditional application of the exception is illustrated as 
A = y, + Y2 + Ya + ... Yn' 
If the value of A exceeded the preliminary standard, Q was used on the ultimate 
issue of defendant's guilt. But the Martorano I approach applies the exception as 
A = y, + Y 2 + Y 3 + ... Y n + Q. 
Since Q is a function of A, substituting for Q in the Martorano I equation yields an 
infinite circle. 
43. "[Tlhe phrase 'verbal act' ... is less vague than res gestae only because it 
is couched in English, instead of Latin." Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Ut­
terances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 235 (1922). 
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ant's state of mind. 44 Since they are not offered to prove the trutI\ 
of the matter asserted, they are admissible as nonhearsay. The 
evidentiary significance of a verbal act lies not in the correctness of 
its assertion, but rather in the bare fact that the statement was 
made. The utterance allows an inference about the speaker's state 
of mind. This inference need not be tested by cross-examination 
because it is not dependent on the memory, perception, or narra­
tion of the speaker. 45 
The court applied this principle to· certain Pagano statements 
which indicated his complicity in the Pallotta loan. As verbal acts, 
these statements were admissible "in their own right."46 The court 
considered these newly admissible statements along with other in­
dependent evidence linking Pagano and Martorano in conspiracy. 
It concluded that this evidence constituted a sufficient independent 
showing of conspiracy, as required by the traditional form of the 
exception. 47 
Because the initial use of Pagano's statements as "verbal acts" 
is properly limited to showing his state of mind, close analysis 
reveals a logical flaw in the use of these statements in the inde­
pendent preliminary showing of conspiracy at Martorano's trial. 
Dubbing the statements "verbal acts" does not cure any possible 
objective unreliability in Pagano's statements. Verbal act theory al­
lows those statements to inform the factfinder only of Pagano's then 
existing state of mind. It does no more; the permissible use of the 
statement has been narrowed to the point at which hearsay objec­
tions do not come into play. The statements, used as "verbal acts," 
cannot tell us whether Pagano is a competent reporter of any ex­
ternal facts. To learn whether these facts exist as reported, one 
must test the accuracy of his belief by cross-examination. 
Consequently, the broadest permissible inference from Paga­
no's statements is that Pagano thought he was a coconspirator with 
Martorano. The reasoning process must stop with that inference. 
To continue on to the next logical step, that there actually was a 
conspiracy, is to infer from Pagano's state of mind the truth of the 
external reality that allegedly ~ave rise to his state of mind. This 
44. 561 F.2d at 407. The court cites 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at § 1790 
entitled "Utterances as indicating circumstantially the speaker's own state of mind." 
45. This list omits sincerity, the fourth potential infirmity of hearsay, because 
it affects the validity of the inference. If, for example, the speaker is joking, the 
inference of her state of mind will be inaccurate. See Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 
WASH. L. REv. 1,6 (1937). 
46. 561 F.2d at 407. 
47. Id. 
222 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:211 
inference of course depends on the accuracy of his belief. The 
hearsay rule forbids the final inference48 because its validity de­
pends on the memory, perception, and narration of the out-of-court 
speaker, Pagano. 
Rather than forge an opinion based on fundamental hearsay 
principles, the court cited United States v. Calarco 49 as precedent 
for its proposition that the verbal acts of an alleged coconspirator 
are properly considered in the independent showing of conspiracy 
against the nondeclarant co-defendant. In Calarco, two defen­
dants, Calarco and Riviello, were accused of hijacking a truck. The 
government's witness testified that after defendant Calarco spoke in 
private with Riviello (the nondeclarant co-defendant, analogous to 
Martorano in the principal case), Calarco said to the other con­
spirators, "This is where you are going to bring the truck. "50 The 
court characterized this statement as a verbal act and considered it 
as independent evidence on the preliminary issue of Riviello's par­
ticipation in the conspiracy. In the court's view, the statement was 
a reliable indication that Riviello had given an instruction that was 
relayed to the other conspirators. 
Although the Calarco court did not specifY exactly which 
branch of the verbal act concept51 it used, the usage approximates 
that of the First Circuit in Martorano II. The apparent reasoning of 
Calarco includes an impermissible inference similar to the one in 
Martorano II. Calarco's conduct inferentially indicated his belief 
48. "It is only when the statement is offered as the basis for the inferences, 
first, that the declarant believed it, and, second, that the facts were in accordance 
with his belief, that the evidence is said to be hearsay." C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 250 (2d ed. 1972) (emphasis in original). An approximation of the 
reasoning in Martorano II is the rule from Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 
285 (1892). Though Hillman involved an express declaration of intention, rather than 
an indirect expression as in Martorana II, the reasoning is instructive. In Hillman, a 
third person's letter declaring an intention to leave Wichita with Hillmon was admit­
ted into evidence to prove that Hillmon had left Wichita with the writer. The infer­
ence from the writer's stated belief, that he would leave with Hillmon, to the reality 
underlying that belief, the subsequent conduct, -is permissible under the Hillman 
rule. That rule, however, has been strictly limited to proving subsequent conduct. An 
extension of the Hillman rule to include past conduct "would amount to allowing the 
exception for declarations of mental state to swallow substantially the entire hearsay 
rule." C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 296 (footnote omitted). 
49. 424 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). 
50. Id. at 660 n.1. 
51. Wigmore divides the concept into three branches: 1) Utterances forming a 
part of the issue (operative facts); 2) Utterances forming a verbal part of an act; and 
3) Utterances used as circumstantial evidence. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, 
§§ 1766-1792. 
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that he was a cog in the hijacking plan. This belief is relevant to 
the determination of Calarco's participation, but it clearly cannot 
implicate Riviello. To implicate Riviello, a further inference is 
necessary, specifically, that Calarco's belief in the existence of a 
plan to bring the truck to a certain location reflected reality. This 
inference is only warranted if we trust the memory, perception, 
narration, and sincerity of the out-of-court speaker and is therefore 
prohibited by the hearsay rule. 52 The imprecise reasoning of 
Calarco is uncritically relied upon in Martorano II. The misuse of 
the verbal acts concept in Calarco and Martorano II short-circuits 
the traditional independent evidence requirement and leaves the 
evidence admitted on the strength of that preliminary showing 
without sufficient assurances of reliability. 
In the end we are left with two approaches that convert 
Pagano's hearsay into competent evidence that supports a criminal 
conviction. 53 The first approach, bootstrapping, extends the pro­
cedural provisions of rule l04(a) to the point at which that rule 
collides with the well-established substantive provisions of rule 
801(d)(2)(E), the coconspirators exception. Surprisingly, in this col­
lision, the substantive provisions yield, and the court is allowed to 
consider nonindependent evidence in its preliminary determina­
tion. The alternative "verbal acts" approach attempts to satisfY the 
independent evidence requirement by treating statements that are 
properly restricted to indicating a declarant's state of mind as hard 
evidence of the involvement of others in a conspiracy. 
Both approaches concededly led the court to a plausible re­
sult in the instant case. The Pagano statements, when considered 
against the background circumstances, evoke an intuitive feeling of 
credibility and suggest that the conviction in the principal case may 
well have been proper. The problem is that in our system of pro­
cedural safeguards, intuition should not be allowed to support a 
conviction. Martorano has set an unfortunate precedent. Its proce­
dures represent a unique version of the coconspirators exception, a 
version stripped of its most effective means of assuring the relia­
bility of pivotal hearsay statements-the independent evidence 
requirement. 
Paul R. McCary 
52. See note 44 supra. 
53. Martorano was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and fined $10,000.00. 
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3. 
